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1.  Introduction 
 
As a non-international armed conflict continued in the eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo between the DRC armed forces and 
non-state armed groups, the United Nations Security Council acting on 
the recommendation of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and in re-
sponse to the call of the governments in Africa’s Great Lakes region, 
adopted Resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013, which extended the man-
date of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and authorised the 
creation of an ‘Intervention Brigade’ to conduct offensive operations 
against armed rebel groups. The Brigade is a ‘first-ever offensive com-
bat force’ intended to carry out targeted operations against 23 March 
Movement (M23) and other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups 
in eastern DRC.1 As stressed in the resolution, the Intervention Brigade 
is established within the operation’s existing force ‘on an exceptional 
basis and without creating a precedent or any prejudice to the agreed 
principles of peacekeeping’.2  With reference to Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, the resolution authorises MONUSCO to take ‘all necessary 
measures’ to perform the mandated tasks, through its military compo-
nent – its regular forces and its Intervention Brigade as appropriate. 
∗ Associate Teaching Fellow in Law, Coventry University London Campus. 
1 UNSC Press Release ‘“Intervention Brigade” Authorized as Security Council 
Grants Mandate Renewal’ (28 March 2013) UN Doc SC/10964 available at 
<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10964.doc.htm>. All other websites were last 
checked on 31 January 2015. 
2 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) S/RES/2098 para 9. 
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Specifically, MONUSCO is authorised, in support of the authorities of 
DRC and taking full account of the need to protect civilians, to carry 
out: 
 
‘(…) targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade 
(…) either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly 
mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with internation-
al law, including international humanitarian law and with the human 
rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces 
(HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize 
these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objec-
tive of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority 
and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabiliza-
tion activities’.3 
 
In October and November 2013 MONUSCO participated in robust 
Congolese-led operations against the M23, which led to the military de-
feat of the movement.4 MONUSCO support included combat opera-
tions by ground troops from the Intervention Brigade, attack helicop-
ters, artillery and mortar fire, and logistics support.5 On 28 March 2014 
the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter unan-
imously renewed the mandate of MONUSCO, including its Interven-
tion Brigade, until 31 March 2015.6  The period following the extension 
of the mandate was characterised by further momentum in the efforts of 
MONUSCO to neutralise armed rebel groups in support of the Congo-
lese armed forces.7 The Mission provided support to FARDC opera-
tions against various military factions in the eastern Congo and these 
operations were marked by heavy fighting, with significant casualties 
3 ibid para 12(b). 
4 The Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (17 December 2013) 
S/2013/757 para 17. 
5 ibid para 40. 
6 UNSC Res 2147 (28 March 2014) S/RES/2147 para 1. 
7 The Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (5 March 2014) 
S/2014/157 para 39 and The Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (30 June 
2014) S/2014/450 para 28. 
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sustained by both the rebels and FARDC.8 As announced by a senior 
UN envoy on 8 January 2015, the DRC government jointly with 
MONUSCO and its Intervention Brigade will continue the military of-
fensive against the Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the 
Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC. The FDLR refused to disarm and 
surrender unconditionally by 2 January 2015 and the Secretary-General 
has urged for ‘decisive action’ against them.9 
As noted above, the Intervention Brigade has been involved in a 
number of combat operations since its creation,10 which gives rise to le-
gal questions regarding the applicability of international humanitarian 
law (IHL) to such use of force, the status of its personnel and conse-
quently the lawfulness of attacks against them. This contribution will 
analyse these issues from the perspective of the protection afforded to 
peacekeeping missions under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome 
Statute proscribe as a war crime in international and non-international 
armed conflicts respectively: 
 
‘(…) intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, ma-
terial, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peace-
keeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civil-
ian objects under the international law of armed conflict’.   
 
This contribution examines the question of whether MONUSCO 
with its Intervention Brigade, a ‘first-ever offensive combat force’, can 
be regarded as a ‘peacekeeping mission’ covered by the protective re-
gime of Article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute applicable in non-
8 ibid (S/2014/450) para 53. 
9 <www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2015/01/un-priority-for-2015-disarming-
rebels-in-the-congo/#.VMGJ4ih8vww>.  
10 See also press releases e.g.: D Oliver, ‘How M23 was rolled back’, African 
Defence Review (October 2013) available at <www.africandefence.net/analysis-how-
m23-was-rolled-back/>; J Stupart, ‘Squaring Up Against the ADF’, African Defence 
Review (6 March 2014) available at <www.africandefence.net/squaring-up-against-the-
adf/>; S Raghavan ‘In Congo, trapped in violence and forgotten’, The Washington Post 
(27 September 2014) available at <www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2014/09/27/in-
congo-trapped-in-violence-and-forgotten/>.  
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international armed conflict.11 The main argument is that regardless of 
its peacekeeping mandate, MONUSCO including its Intervention Bri-
gade is bound by IHL when the conditions for its application have been 
met. The fact that it is a peacekeeping mission and its actions are au-
thorised by the UN Security Council, and therefore legal under ius ad 
bellum, does not grant the immunity under ius in bello or in any way 
modify the applicability of the latter regime. The status of peacekeeping 
personnel under IHL should be determined exclusively based on their 
actions and facts on the ground. The distinction should also be made 
between civilian and military personnel of the mission. If military per-
sonnel from MONUSCO engage in hostilities with non-state armed 
groups and become a party to a non-international armed conflict, they 
are subject to IHL rules like any other armed force. This effectively 
means that peacekeeping military personnel should be considered com-
batants for the purpose of the principle of distinction and therefore le-
gitimate targets for as long as the mission is a party to the conflict. It al-
so means that they will not be covered by Article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. 
The above argument is built upon the analysis of two major issues, 
and this is reflected in the structure of the article. First, it considers 
whether MONUSCO and its Intervention Brigade can be regarded as ‘a 
peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions’ for the purpose of the Rome Statute. Secondly, it examines the 
status of peacekeeping personnel under international humanitarian law 
and the conditions under which they can enjoy protection of Article 
8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. Finally, it applies the conclusions of this 
analysis to MONUSCO and its Intervention Brigade and recapitulates 
the main argument of the paper. 
11 The DRC is a State-party to the Rome Statute and the conflict in its territory is 
classified as non-international. The author shares the majority view that the involvement of 
multinational armed forces, such as UN peace operations, in a non-international armed 
conflict in support of governmental forces against non-state armed groups does not 
internationalise the conflict, see e.g.: ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the 
Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, Report of the 31st International Conference 
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC, Geneva 2011) available at 
<www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/ 
31-int-conference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-1-2-en.pdf>; S Vité, ‘Typology of Armed 
Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations’ (2009) 
91 Intl Rev Red Cross 69. 
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2.  ‘A peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’ 
 
Neither the Rome Statute nor the Elements of Crimes thereto pro-
vide a definition of a ‘peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations’. Defining ‘peacekeeping’ is not an easy 
task since the concept was not conceived as a part of a well-considered 
theoretical framework or a coherent doctrine. It was born in practice, or 
rather the term ‘peacekeeping’ was invented after the practice had al-
ready begun.12 Peacekeeping was developed during the Cold War when, 
due to ideological differences, the Security Council was unable to per-
form collective security actions.13 It is not mentioned anywhere in the 
UN Charter and the Organization itself was for years disinclined to de-
fine it, most likely because ‘to define peace-keeping was to impose a 
strait-jacket on a concept whose flexibility made it the most pragmatic 
instrument at the disposal of the world organization’.14 Although there 
is still no single and authoritative UN definition of peacekeeping, there 
is an agreement regarding three constitutional principles that have tra-
ditionally governed UN peacekeeping operations, namely: consent of 
the parties to the conflict to the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, 
impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of 
the mandate.15 These principles were derived from the experiences of 
12 T Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (OUP 2002) 4; W J Durch, 
M L England, The Purposes of Peace Operations (Center on International Cooperation 
2009) 9.  
13 For a general discussion see e.g.: O Schachter and C Joyner (eds), United Nations 
Legal Order (CUP 1995); H McCoubrey and N D White, The Blue Helmets: Legal 
Regulation of United Nations Military Operations (Dartmouth 1996); M Bothe, ‘Peace-
keeping’ in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd edn, 
OUP 2002) 661; N MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (Routledge 
2006). 
14 As remarked by Shashi Tharoor, the Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-
General for Special Political Affairs/Peacekeeping Operations in 1989-1996 
‘peacekeeping was an activity that the United Nations had always been politically 
reluctant to define’. S Tharoor, ‘The Changing Face of Peace-keeping and Peace-
enforcement’ (1995) 19 Fordham Intl L J 408, 414. 
15 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field 
Support, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (2008) 6 
<http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf> [hereinafter: 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines] 31ff. 
 
 
30 QIL 13 (2015), 25-40          ZOOM IN 
traditional ceasefire-monitoring missions16 and they are rooted in the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter. They are in line with the 
principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence 
of States and non-intervention in matters that are essentially within their 
domestic jurisdiction. They also underline a conceptual and constitu-
tional distinction between peacekeeping and (peace) enforcement. The 
clear demarcation line between these two types of operations was drawn 
by the International Court of Justice in Certain Expenses of the United 
Nations Advisory Opinion (1962) at the beginning of a peacekeeping 
practice.17 Peacekeeping is conceptually different from (peace) en-
forcement because it does not involve ‘preventive or enforcement 
measures’ under Chapter VII of the UN Charter against a State. En-
forcement action, on the other hand, is an exception to the prohibition 
of the use of force in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as it uses force 
against a culpable State or States to enforce peace or impose a political 
solution without their consent.  
Traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and 
non-use of force except in self-defence continue to apply despite the 
evolution and transformation that peacekeeping has undergone moving 
beyond traditional ceasefire monitoring. However, they do not apply in 
their original form; they had to be re-defined in response to new and 
evolving political and operational challenges.18 For example, the princi-
ple of consent has its origins in the early UN peacekeeping practice of 
deploying observer missions in inter-state conflicts. The United Nations 
was dealing with two or more sovereign States and needed their consent 
to the measure to deprive the action of enforcement character. The 
16 The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld elaborated on the characteristics 
of the first armed peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF 
I) established in 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis, in his Reports to the General 
Assembly, which consequently became the defining legal principles of UN 
peacekeeping in the coming decades; see e.g.: Second and final report of the Secretary-
General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force requested in 
resolution 998 (ES-I), adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1956 (06 
November 1956) UN Doc A/3302. 
17 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, 
166, 177. 
18 N Tsagourias, ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in 
Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension’ (2007) 11 J Conflict Security Studies 
465; A J Bellamy, P D Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping (2nd edn, Polity Press 
2010) 173. 
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changing nature of conflicts and new circumstances of internal strife 
with which peacekeepers are confronted have influenced the under-
standing of the consent requirement. As stipulated in UN reports, in a 
non-international armed conflict, consent must be obtained from a 
host-State, whereas consent from local factions, who are parties to such 
conflict should be sought as a practical measure to facilitate the opera-
tion of the mission, but not out of a legal obligation.19 This approach 
appears sound, as non-state actors do not have a standing equal to 
States under international law. The traditional position of international 
law admits the existence of the right of a recognised government to in-
vite foreign forces to assist it in combatting rebels.20 
The second principle of impartiality also dates back to the early 
peacekeeping missions and the realities of that time and, similarly to the 
principle of consent, has undergone a number of modifications since 
then. As stressed in UN peacekeeping doctrine, impartiality does not 
mean neutrality in the sense of inactivity or treating the parties as moral 
equals – following bitter lessons learned from the experience in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Impartiality now refers to the way the 
mandate should be implemented by a peacekeeping mission at the op-
erational level. Peacekeeping missions must be impartial in their deal-
ings with the parties and rigorously execute the mandate without favour 
or prejudice to any party.21 Also the principle of non-use of force except 
in self-defence has changed under UN law – it has been transformed 
from its narrow origins of personal self-defence to include ‘defence of 
the mission’ or ‘defence of the mandate’. Peacekeeping is still distinct 
from peace enforcement as it does not use force against a State at the 
international or strategic level. It might, however, take a robust form at 
the tactical level to support the peace process, to defend the mission 
and the mandate from spoilers and criminals. 22 The core business of 
peacekeeping is to create a secure and stable environment to facilitate 
the political process. Within this context the primary distinction be-
19 E.g.: The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (October 2000) 
UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 (The Brahimi Report). 
20 The International Court of Justice referred to this principle in the case 
concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 para 246. 
21 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 15) 33. 
22 ibid 35. 
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tween peace enforcement and robust peacekeeping is thus more about 
the objectives of the use of force and less about how much force is be-
ing used, although certain caveats apply.23 A mission might be author-
ised by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Char-
ter to ‘use all necessary means’ against criminal gangs and spoilers ‘to 
deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, to protect civil-
ians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national 
authorities in maintaining law and order’.24 The use of force to defend 
the mandate must be seen as a concept distinct from personal self-
defence as they rest on two different legal bases. Defence of the man-
date derives its validity from a binding resolution of the Security Coun-
cil and it has to be authorised each time, whereas the right to personal 
self-defence is an inherent right of every individual and exists inde-
pendently of such authorisations. 
The continuing relevance of these three constitutional principles of 
peacekeeping has been confirmed by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) and the International Criminal Court when they were seized on 
cases concerning attacks against peacekeeping missions.25 The similar 
test should also be applied to MONUSCO and its Intervention Brigade 
in order to establish whether the mission is a peacekeeping mission and 
therefore whether it could be covered by the protective regime of the 
Rome Statute.  
 
 
3.  MONUSCO as a peacekeeping mission 
 
MONUSCO was established by Security Council resolution 1925 of 
28 May 2010 to take over from an earlier mission deployed in the DRC - 
the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (MONUC). It was authorised to use ‘all necessary means’ to 
23 C de Coning, J Detzel, P Hojem, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone 
Doctrine. Report of the TfP Oslo Doctrine Seminar 14 & 15 May 2008, Oslo, Norway’ 
(2008) 14 Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI Report Security in Practice 
4. 
24 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines (n 15) 34. 
25 The Prosecutor v Issa Hassan Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, 
(Judgment) SCSL-04-15-T (2 March 2009); The Prosecutor v Bahar Idriss Abu Garda 
(Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-02/05-02/09 (8 February 2010). 
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carry out its mandate relating, inter alia, to the protection of civilians 
and humanitarian personnel under imminent threat of physical violence 
and to support the government of the DRC in its stabilisation and peace 
consolidation efforts.26 The mission was deployed with the consent of 
the government of the DRC and the Security Council has continuously 
stressed ‘its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and po-
litical independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’.27 In line 
with the principle of impartiality in execution of a peacekeeping man-
date, which should not be confused with neutrality, and in accordance 
with Human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to 
non-United Nations security forces,28 the mission must ensure that any 
support provided to DRC forces is consistent with the purposes and 
principles set out in the UN Charter and with its responsibility to re-
spect, promote and encourage respect for international humanitarian, 
human rights and refugee law.29 The Chapter VII authorisation to use 
‘all necessary means’ to fulfil the mandate, which in Security Council 
parlance stands for the use of force beyond self-defence,30 is consistent 
with peacekeeping principles on the use of force, as long as force is not 
employed against a State at the strategic or international level. If this 
condition is met, ‘robustness’ and proactive use of force against spoilers 
and criminals does not turn MONUSCO into an enforcement tool. 
With these considerations in mind it seems justified to conclude that 
MONUSCO is a ‘peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations’. As regards the Intervention Brigade, Resolution 
2098 (2013) stresses that the Brigade has been established as an integral 
part of MONUSCO and remains under the same command and control 
arrangements.31 Specifically, it is not meant to be an enforcement meas-
ure operating alongside the existing peacekeeping operation and sup-
portive to it, but rather under the command and control of participat-
26 The original mandate of MONUSCO was further detailed in UNSC Res 2053 (27 
June 2012) S/RES/2053. 
27 See e.g.: UNSC Res 1925 (28 May 2010) S/RES/1925, UNSC Res 2053 (27 June 
2012) S/RES/2053, UNSC Res (28 March 2014) S/RES/2147. 
28 A/67/775–S/2013/110 (5 March 2013). 
29 ibid. 
30 T Findlay (n 12) 7-9; R McLaughalin, ‘The Regime Applicable to Use of Lethal 
Force When Operating under a United Nations Security Council Chapter VII Mandate 
Authorising “All Necessary Means”’ (2008) 12 J Conflict Security L 389. 
31 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) S/RES/2098 (2013) para 9. 
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ing states, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.32 Reso-
lutions 2098 (2013) and 2147 (2014) reaffirm in their preambles ‘the 
basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, im-
partiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of 
the mandate’.33 Given the structural integration of the Brigade with the 
existing peacekeeping operation, as well as the consent of the host state, 
DRC, to its newly transformed mandate,34 MONUSCO as a whole can 
be regarded a peacekeeping mission for the purpose of Article 
8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute. 
 
 
4.  Status of peacekeeping personnel under international humanitarian 
law 
 
There is no specific reference to peacekeeping missions in any of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions or their Additional Protocols.35 An indirect 
reference in Article 37(1)(d) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I relates to 
the prohibition of perfidy and bans ‘the feigning of protected status by 
the use of signs emblems or uniforms of the United Nations or of neu-
tral of other States not Parties to the Conflict’. This provision suggests 
the implied protected status of persons entitled to use these signs and 
has been so assessed by scholars.36 Cottier compares it to the protected 
32 IFOR, UNITAF 
33 UNSC Res 2098 (28 March 2013) S/RES/2098, UNSC Res 2147 (28 March 2014) 
S/RES/2147. 
34 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and La Francophonie of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo expressed his gratitude on behalf of his Government 
and people for United Nations efforts to help protect their country’s territorial integrity 
and foster peace and stability over the past 15 years.  He said that the Security Council’s 
‘innovative decision’ should help the country put a definitive end to the repeated cycles 
of violence and lead to the ‘dawning of a new era’ of human rights and security for all. 
See Press Release, UN Security Council, ‘“Intervention Brigade” Authorized as Security 
Council Grants Mandate Renewal’ (March 28 2013) UN Doc SC/10964 available at 
<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2013/sc10964.doc.htm>. 
35 M Cottier, ‘War Crimes – para. 2(b)(iii)’ in O Triffterer (ed), Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observers’ notes, article by article (2 
edn, Beck 2008) 335; K Dorman, Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Law. Sources and Commentary (ICRC/CUP 2003) 154, 452. 
36 M Cottier (n 35) 336; J Doria, ‘Attacks on UN and Regional Organisations 
Peacekeepers: Potential Legal Issues Before the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 5 
Intl Studies J 65-66. 
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status of civilians and persons hors de combat.37 However, it should be 
noted that the same article contains a separate paragraph prohibiting 
‘the feigning of an intent to surrender, or an incapacitation by wounds 
or sickness, or civilian, non-combatant status’,38 which suggests that the 
protected status related to the UN might be of a distinct nature. Despite 
the lack of the explicit qualification of peacekeeping personnel in core 
IHL treaties, peacekeepers will belong either to the category of combat-
ants or the category of civilians, as the two are complementary and mu-
tually exclusive and there is no intermediate status between them. It 
should be noted though that following the concept of ‘integrated mis-
sions’, most contemporary peacekeeping operations consist of a number 
of different components: military, police and civilian.39 The Rome Stat-
ute does not make any reference to this fact as it speaks only of a 
‘peacekeeping mission’ as a whole. Articles 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii) 
prohibit intentionally directing attacks against peacekeeping personnel 
and objects ‘as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civil-
ians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict’, 
which implies that such personnel and objects should be considered ci-
vilians and civilian objects. While the status of civilian police and civil-
ian personnel such as administrative and humanitarian staff should not 
cause much controversy, the same is not true for military personnel, 
who consist of armed forces of troop-contributing countries. The issue 
of personal scope of the application of IHL should therefore be as-
sessed for each category of personnel separately. The SCSL and the 
ICC, both seized of the attacks against peacekeeping missions, did not 
distinguish between different categories of personnel nor explain why 
37 ibid. 
38 Art 37(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I 
See also: Commentary on the Additional Protocols (n 137) 439-440; C Greenwood 
‘Protection of Peacekeepers: The Legal Regime’ (1996) 7 Duke J Comp Intl L 185, 190. 
The protective rules explicitly applying to peacekeepers can also be found in the 1980 
Conventional Weapons Convention (Article 9) and its Protocol II on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Article 8). 
39 The concept of ‘integration’ of the UN activities in the field was formally 
introduced in 1997, although various efforts aiming at achieving greater coherence 
within the UN system were undertaken long before. Calling for ‘unity of purpose’, the 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan initiated in 1997 a programme for UN reform centred on 
‘integration’ between its humanitarian, peace-keeping and political structures. See: 
United Nations. Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform. Report of the 
Secretary General (14 July 1997) A/51/950. 
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all of them should be protected as civilians.40 The courts simply ruled 
that both peace operations under consideration were peacekeeping mis-
sions in accordance with the UN Charter and therefore their personnel 
and objects should enjoy the protection given to civilians and civilian 
objects. It should be noted that such an approach has a direct impact 
on the temporal scope of application of IHL to peacekeeping person-
nel. As civilians, they would benefit from the protection against direct 
attacks unless and for such time as they directly participate in the hostil-
ities. The notion of direct participation in hostilities refers to specific 
hostile acts carried out in the course of armed conflict by individual ci-
vilians not associated with armed forces of the parties to the conflict.41 
Such civilians lose their protection only temporarily for the duration of 
specific hostile acts. This necessarily creates a ‘revolving-door’ effect, 
but since civilian involvement in hostilities occurs on a sporadic, spon-
taneous or unorganized basis, such temporary and activity-based loss of 
protection is justified. It would not be justified, however, if the partici-
pation in hostilities continues in a commanded and organized way, 
which might be the case for a military component of a peacekeeping 
mission, especially if it is mandated to carry out ‘targeted offensive op-
erations’ against rebel armed groups.  
For the purpose of determining whether peacekeepers are entitled 
to the protection of civilians, an alternative approach to the one taken 
by the international courts should be considered, namely whether or 
not peacekeepers qualify as combatants.42 This approach is informed by 
the way the definitions of the combatant and civilian statuses are con-
structed in IHL treaties. Combatants have the right to participate di-
rectly in hostilities and they can be targeted at all times. They are de-
fined in Article 43 of the Additional Protocol I as members of the 
armed forces of a party to a conflict consisting of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units under a command responsible to that party for 
the conduct of its subordinates. Such armed forces shall be subject to 
an internal disciplinary system to enforce their compliance with the 
40 Sesay et al (n 25) para 233; Abu Garda case (n 25) para 126. 
41 See e.g.: the ICRC study by N Melzer, Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC 2009). 
42 See the analysis of international jurisprudence in O Engdahl, ‘Prosecution of 
Attacks against Peacekeepers in International Courts and Tribunals’ (2012) 51 Military 
L and L War Rev 249, 275-276. 
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rules of international humanitarian law.43 This definition of armed forc-
es is based on the qualifications of belligerents in the Hague Regulations 
and the qualifications of prisoners of war in the Third Geneva Conven-
tion.44 Civilians, on the other hand, are defined negatively/by exclusion, 
as persons who are not members of the armed forces, as set forth in Ar-
ticle 50 of the Additional Protocol I.45 As already stated above, civilians 
enjoy the protection from direct attacks unless and for such time as they 
take a direct part in hostilities.46 There is no formal combatant status in 
non-international armed conflict. Treaties applicable to this type of 
armed conflict use the terms ‘civilian’, ‘armed forces’ and ‘organized 
armed group’ but do not define them. These concepts should, neverthe-
less, be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to them in their context and in the light of the object 
and purpose of IHL.47 Since the protection of persons who are not or 
are no longer participating in the hostilities is one of the main goals of 
international humanitarian law and the principle of distinction applies 
in all armed conflicts,48 the parties to a non-international armed conflict 
43 State practice has established this rule as a norm of customary international law 
applicable in international armed conflicts. For the purposes of the principle of 
distinction, it may also apply to State armed forces in non-international armed conflicts; 
see J -M Henckaerts and L Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
vol I (ICRC/CUP 2005) Rule 4.  
44 Art 1 of Annex to the Hague Convention IV: Regulations respecting the laws and 
customs of war on land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 
(1907) 205 CTS 227, art 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Geneva Convention 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into 
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135. 
45 Art 50 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3. 
46 Art 51(3) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 3. 
47 Art 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331. 
48 The ICRC Customary International Law Study recognised the principle of 
distinction as a customary international law norm applicable to both types of armed 
conflicts, see: Rule 1 (Distinction between Civilians and Combatants) and Rule 7 
(Distinction between Civilian Objects and Military Objectives) of and commentary to 
these rules. For a general discussion on the customary status of the principle of 
distinction see e.g.: C Greenwood ‘Customary Law Status of the 1977 Additional 
Protocols’ in A J M Delissen, G J Tanja (eds) Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict- 
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must draw a distinction between combatants understood in a generic 
sense as those who fight (‘fighters’)49 and non-combatants, including ci-
vilians, who do not fight.50  
The analysis of the status of peacekeeping forces under IHL should 
start with examining whether they can qualify as armed forces belong-
ing to a party to a conflict; it is only if that is resolved in the negative, 
that they should be considered as falling into the category of civilians. 
The fact that peacekeeping operations are often deployed in situations 
of armed conflict does not automatically make them warring parties. 
There are certain conditions that must be fulfilled to determine the ex-
istence of an armed conflict involving peacekeeping forces and trigger-
ing the applicable legal framework. In the case of a non-international 
armed conflict, the fighting must occur between two or more parties 
demonstrating a certain level of organization and it must have reached a 
certain threshold of intensity.51 A military component of a peacekeeping 
mission easily fulfils the requirement of internal structure and organiza-
tion, yet it should not be considered a party to the conflict unless it en-
gages in sustained combat with an organized armed group or groups 
reaching the threshold of intensity required by IHL. If that happens, 
members of the military component will become combatants for the 
purposes of the principle of distinction and lose the protection against 
direct attacks as long as the peacekeeping mission is a party to that con-
flict.52 Their loss of protection will be status-based, hence they will be 
legitimate targets at all times, not only when directly participating in 
hostilities. This conclusion will apply to all military personnel of peace-
keeping forces regardless of their specific function, which is consistent 
with the logic of IHL and the principle of distinction. Accordingly, all 
other non-military personnel of a peacekeeping mission must be regard-
Challenges Ahead (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 108; Y Dinstein The Conduct of Hostilities 
under the Law of International Armed Conflict (CUP 2004) 82. 
49 E.g.: the term ‘fighters’ is used in the Manual on the Law of Non-International 
Armed Conflict, International Institute of Humanitarian Law (Sanremo 2006) 4. 
50 Common Art 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Arts 1(1) and 13 of the 
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International armed conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, 
entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609. 
51 T Ferraro, ‘The applicability and application of international humanitarian law to 
multinational forces’ (2013) 95 Intl Rev Red Cross 561, 576. 
52 ibid 606. 
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ed as civilians for the purposes of IHL. Thus they will benefit from the 
protection against direct attacks unless and for such time as they direct-
ly participate in the hostilities.  
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
In line with the considerations above, when MONUSCO’s forces, 
including its Intervention Brigade, engage in hostilities with non-state 
armed groups in the eastern DRC while pursuing the mandate of ‘neu-
tralizing’ and disarming them and when fighting reaches the threshold 
for the applicability of IHL, they should be regarded as combatants (in 
a generic sense) and therefore legitimate military targets. The fact that 
their actions are undertaken in the fulfilment of the peacekeeping man-
date and are legal under ius ad bellum is irrelevant for the applicability 
of IHL. Neither combatant nor civilian status depends on the decision 
of the Security Council to establish a peacekeeping mission but on the 
fulfilment of the criteria stipulated by international humanitarian law 
and actual conduct of the members of the mission. The Secretary-
General’s reports on MONUSCO from 2013 and 2014 seem to confirm 
that the criteria for the applicability of IHL have been met, as the re-
ports talk about on-going combat operations by the Congolese armed 
forces supported by MONUSCO and its Intervention Brigade against 
various armed groups in the eastern DRC. These operations have been 
described as ‘robust’, involving ground troops, attack helicopters, artil-
lery and mortar fire and marked by heavy fighting, with significant cas-
ualties on both sides.53 If it is concluded that MONUSCO has become a 
party to a non-international armed conflict in the DRC, this will not 
change the characterisation of the mission as a peacekeeping mission 
since the robust use of force is allowed at the tactical level against spoil-
ers and criminals. In such circumstances, however, the mission’s mili-
tary personnel, including the Intervention Brigade, as well as other bri-
gades, whether or not actually engaged in combat, will not benefit from 
53 The Reports of the Secretary General on the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: S/2013/757 (17 
December 2013), S/2013/773 (23 December 2013), S/2014/157 (05 March 2014), 
S/2014/450 (30 June 2014), S/2014/698 (25 September 2014), S/2014/956 (30 
December 2014), S/2014/957 (30 December 2014). 
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the protection of Article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The protective regime of the Rome Statute will 
only cover civilian personnel unless and for such time as they take a di-
rect part in hostilities. 
 
 
 
